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Social Support Substitution and the Earnings Rebound:
Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity
in Disability Insurance Reform †
By Lex Borghans, Anne C. Gielen, and Erzo F. P. Luttmer *
We exploit a cohort discontinuity in the stringency of Dutch disability
reforms to estimate the effects of decreased DI (disability insurance)
generosity on behavior of existing recipients. We find evidence of
social support substitution: individuals on average offset €1.00 of
lost DI benefits by collecting €0.30 more from other social assistance
programs, but this benefit-substitution effect declines over time.
Individuals also exhibit a rebound in earnings: earnings increase by
€0.62 on average per euro of lost DI benefits and this effect remains
roughly constant over time. This is strong evidence of substantial
remaining earnings capacity among long-term claimants of DI.
(JEL I38, J14, J22, J28, J31)

B

ecause estimates of labor supply responses are of tremendous policy relevance,
the literature on the effects of changes in the eligibility criteria or generosity of social assistance programs1 has rightly focused on labor supply responses.
These estimates, however, do not capture two additional policy-relevant dimensions
of the response to changes in social assistance programs. First, they miss potential spillover effects to other social assistance programs that arise when individuals
substitute between programs. Such social support substitution reduces the welfare
impact of reductions in generosity of any given program on recipients of that program. Moreover, social support substitution may decrease the reduced-form labor
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University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands, and IZA (e-mail: Gielen@ese.eur.nl);
Luttmer: Department of Economics, Dartmouth College, 6106 Rockefeller Center, Hanover, NH 03755 (e-mail:
Erzo.FP.Luttmer@dartmouth.edu). We would like to thank Gerard van den Berg, Amy Finkelstein, Paul Frijters,
Pierre Gielen, Ed Glaeser, Bart Golsteyn, David Johnston, Pierre Koning, Peter Kuhn, Ellen Meara, Jon Skinner,
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1
We use the term social assistance generically to refer to any social insurance or income maintenance programs
rather than to a specific program.
34

Vol. 6 No. 4

Borghans et al.: Social Support Substitution

35

supply response to changes in generosity of a particular program when individuals
take up other programs instead of adjusting their labor supply. Evidence on the
extent of social support substitution is also important for policymakers because it
allows them to make more accurate predictions of the budgetary impact of a reform
to a social assistance program by taking into account the spillover effects of the
reform on participation in other programs. Second, existing estimates of supply
responses typically do not distinguish between responses by existing claimants and
responses by (potential) new enrollees. Evidence of labor supply responses among
existing DI recipients is of importance for policy reforms because effects which
operate on the existing stock of recipients have the potential to make a much greater
immediate impact than effects which operate on the comparatively small inflow into
a DI program.
The Dutch DI system, which also insures against partial loss of earnings capacity,
was significantly reformed in 1993. Two features make this reform particularly
suitable for studying substitution between different social assistance programs as
well as labor supply responses among current recipients. First, we have administrative panel data on the universe of Dutch disability insurance claimants, including
information on their future labor market earnings and their future income from all
other government cash social assistance programs. These data allow us to track for
a period of nearly a decade what happens to (former) disability insurance claimants
in the wake of the reform. Second, the reform contains a cohort discontinuity: the
reform was significantly more stringent and led to an average benefit reduction of an
additional 10 percent for the cohort that turned 45 after August 1, 1993. Because we
have each individual’s month of birth, we exploit this discontinuity by comparing
later labor market earnings and social assistance income for the cohort just below
this age cutoff to outcomes for the cohort just above the age cutoff. We scale this
difference in outcomes by the discontinuity in disability benefit levels around the
age cutoff. This yields two key ratios: (i) the benefit-substitution ratio, which is the
average causal effect of the more stringent DI rules on income from other social
assistance as a fraction of average lost DI income, and (ii) the earnings crowd-out
ratio, which is the average causal effect of the more stringent DI rules on earnings
as a fraction of average lost DI income.
We find that, in the short term (about two years after implementation of the
reform), the more stringent DI rules increase the probability of receiving income
from other social assistance programs by about 4.5 percentage points (on a base of
14 percent), and the income from these other social assistance programs replaces
30 percent of lost DI income. In other words, we find a substantial amount of social
support substitution with a short-term benefit-substitution ratio of 0.30. The more
stringent rules increase the probability of having any earnings by three percentage
points (on a base of 35 percent) and also increase earnings on average. The additional
earnings replace 62 percent of foregone DI income, yielding an earnings crowd-out
ratio of 0.62. Recipients classified as fully disabled have a crowd-out ratio of 0.52,
which is important evidence of a substantial labor supply response among long-term
fully disabled individuals. Combining the effects of social assistance substitution
and earnings crowd-out, we find that individuals are able to replace basically all of
their foregone DI income on average. Specifically, we cannot reject that individuals
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on average fully offset the cut in their DI benefit by increasing income from other
social assistance programs and increasing earnings.
Our data allow us to follow the effects of the cohort discontinuity in the stringency of the reforms over a seven-year period, from approximately two to eight
years after implementation of the reforms. Over this period, the benefit-substitution
ratio falls from 0.30 to 0.14, though even after eight years the benefit-substitution
ratio is still statistically significant. The earnings crowd-out ratio remains roughly
constant over this period. Spillovers between social assistance programs may operate not only through former DI recipients’ own choices, but could potentially also
operate through the decisions of their spouses. However, we do not find any statistically significant evidence of responses by spouses in terms of labor supply or social
assistance receipt. The point estimates indicate that spouses increase their labor supply but do not change their social assistance receipt. This implies that if we measure
earnings crowd-out and benefit substitution at the household level rather than at the
individual level, we find a higher earnings crowd-out ratio (about 18 percentage
points higher) and a similar benefit-substitution ratio.
While the precise magnitudes of our findings are specific to this particular Dutch
disability insurance reform, we believe our paper offers important lessons that are
widely applicable. First, our evidence demonstrates that social support substitution occurs at an economically meaningful scale for prime-age disability insurance
recipients. Hence, a carefully designed reform of a social assistance program would
be well advised to take into account its effects on other social assistance programs.
Second, our findings show that even long-term disability insurance recipients can
still exhibit a meaningful rebound in their labor supply. Third, to measure the full
impact of social insurance reforms on labor supply and reliance on other forms of
social insurance, it is important to also consider effects over the longer term and to
take possible behavioral responses of spouses into account.
Our findings on the existence of spillover effects between different social
assistance programs confirm earlier results from other contexts.2 With respect to
child-related benefits, Garrett and Glied (2000) show that the increase in child
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility in the early 1990s led to a greater
increase in SSI enrollment in states with less generous benefits for Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC). Moreover, Schmidt and Sevak (2004) show that
states that reduced the generosity of their AFDC program experienced increases
in SSI enrollments. Both studies suggest that families substitute between SSI
and AFDC. Kubik (2003) shows that the substitution of SSI for AFDC is larger
in states with negative fiscal shocks, suggesting that states actively encourage this
2
An exception is a paper by Autor and Duggan (2008), in which they exploit a ruling that suddenly expanded
the eligibility for Veterans’ Disability Compensation (DC) for a subgroup of Vietnam Veterans. They find that the
increased take-up of Veteran’s Disability Compensation due to this ruling raised the receipt of Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. As Autor and Duggan note, this result may be explained by the fact that one
needs leave the labor force to qualify for SSDI, and leaving the labor force is less costly for people who already
receive DC. Thus, this institutional feature may explain the complementarity between two social assistance programs in this case. Another exception is Inderbitzin, Staubli, and Zweimüller (2013), who find that extended UI
(unemployment insurance) benefits for workers in their early fifties increases the probability that these workers
subsequently use Austria’s relaxed DI systems for workers aged 55+ as a pathway to retirement. However, they do
find that, for workers aged 55+, extended UI benefits substitute for DI.
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substitution (because the state-share in SSI payments is generally lower than the
state-share in AFDC payments). Duggan and Kearney (2007) examine panel data to
find that households in which a child becomes eligible for SSI subsequently receive
less income from AFDC, WIC, and food stamps.3
Regarding substitution among programs focusing on adults, Bound (1989)
already noted that DI and other social assistance programs can act as substitutes,
though he does not provide formal estimates of this effect. Duggan, Singleton, and
Song (2007), Li and Maestas (2008), and Coe and Haverstick (2010) exploit differences by cohort in the generosity of Social Security retirement benefits to show
that a reduction in these retirement benefits led to an increase in applications for or
receipt of Social Security disability benefits. Koning and van Vuuren (2010) use
Dutch administrative data to describe program enrollment after dismissal. They find
that DI substitutes for UI but fail to find evidence that UI substitutes for DI. Using
a regression discontinuity design, Lammers, Bloemen, and Hochguertel (2013) find
that an increase in the stringency of job search requirements for older UI recipients in the Netherlands caused these recipients to be more likely to transition from
UI to DI. Karlström, Palme, and Svensson (2008) use a difference-in-differences
design to examine the effect of the abolition of DI as a path to early retirement
for 60–64-year-olds in Sweden. They find that, in the two to three years following the reform, this group responded by taking up other forms of social assistance
rather than by increasing their labor supply. Finally, Staubli (2011) also uses a
difference-in-differences approach to show that a disability insurance reform that
affected 55–56-year-old males in Austria had spillover effects on their take-up of
unemployment insurance and sick leave, in addition to affecting their labor supply.
Our paper contributes to this literature by estimating substitution between social
support programs for prime-age individuals in a setting that allows us to very cleanly
identify the degree of spillovers between programs. In addition, we extend the literature by examining substitution effects over longer horizons (up to eight years after
the reexaminations for our cohorts took place).
Our estimates also contribute to an extensive literature on the labor supply effects
of disability insurance (see Bound and Burkhauser 1999 for an overview). Parsons
(1980) presents cross-sectional evidence suggesting that the rise in DI generosity has
contributed to the decline in male labor force participation. Gruber (2000) exploits a
natural experiment in Canada and finds a sizeable labor force participation response
from older workers to a change in the generosity of DI benefits. Much of the more
recent work in the United States on labor supply effects of DI compares accepted to
rejected DI applicants. Bound (1989), von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2011),
and Singleton (2012) compare accepted and rejected applicants directly, and those
estimates are probably upper bounds of labor supply effects because there are likely
unmeasured determinants of the rejection decision that are correlated with labor supply. To overcome this issue, other studies use plausibly exogenous variation in rejection rates. Gruber and Kubik (1997) use variation across states and time in rejection
rates; Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) use an age discontinuity in rejection rates
3
WIC (Women, Infants, and Children) provides nutritional assistance to low-income families with young children and pregnant women.
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for a particular subgroup; De Jong, Lindeboom, and van der Klaauw (2011) use
variation in screening severity induced by an experimental intervention; French and
Song (2011) use variation in rejection rates due to the essentially random assignment of administrative law judges to DI cases; and Maestas, Mullen, and Strand
(2013) use variation in rejection rates due to the essentially random assignment
of DI examiners to DI cases. These studies all find clear evidence of labor supply
responses to disability insurance. Autor and Duggan (2003) exploit the interaction
of state disability replacement rates with national changes in program stringency to
find credible evidence that increased DI generosity reduced labor force participation
of high school dropouts.
Despite this extensive literature, much less is known about the degree to which
existing long-term DI recipients can be induced to work. A number of recent papers
have started to amass evidence on this topic. Maestas and Song (2011) use the automatic conversion of DI into Social Security benefits to show that there is a labor supply effect from DI on older disability insurance recipients. Campolieti and Riddell
(2012) use a difference-in-differences design to show that an increase in the earnings exemption increased the propensity to work among existing DI recipients in
Canada. Moore (2012) examines the labor supply response of existing DI recipients
who lost eligibility due to a 1996 US reform that removed alcohol and drug addictions as disabling conditions. He finds a 22-percentage-point increase in employment as a result of these terminations, and notes that the employment response has
an inverse-U shape with a maximum for those who have been on DI for about three
years. Finally, Kostøl and Mogstad (2014) exploit a regression discontinuity to
examine whether financial incentives can induce existing DI recipients in Norway
to increase their labor supply. They find that prime-age DI recipients respond to
these incentives but that DI recipients approaching retirement age do not show a
significant response. Our study contributes to this emerging literature on the work
capabilities of existing DI recipients; we provide well-identified estimates from a
different setting to show strong labor supply responses to changes in DI generosity
among prime-age long-term disability insurance recipients, including individuals
classified as fully disabled.
I. The 1993 Dutch Disability Insurance Reform

After a waiting period of one year, individuals in the Netherlands are entitled to
disability benefits if an illness or infirmity prevents them from earning the amount
they used to earn before the onset of the disability.4 The replacement rate offered by
DI depends on the “degree of disability,” which is defined by the percentage difference between the prior earnings and the remaining potential earnings capacity of the
DI applicant. For readers familiar with the US disability system, it is useful to keep
four key differences between the US and Dutch systems in mind. First, unlike the
US system, the Dutch DI system insures against partial disability, and DI recipients
4
Also see Bovenberg (2000), who provides useful institutional background information on the Dutch disability
act. See García-Gómez, von Gaudecker, and Lindeboom (2011) for further background information and descriptive
evidence of DI enrollment trends and patterns.
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in the Netherlands can simultaneously work (for the fraction of “remaining earnings
capacity”) and receive DI (for the fraction of “lost earnings capacity”). Second,
health insurance and other benefits are not tied to receipt of DI. Third, DI benefits
are only paid to the disabled worker and not adjusted for dependents. Fourth, the
replacement rate only depends on the disability rating, and does not vary by work
history or by level of earnings below the maximal covered earnings. Moreover, the
replacement rate for a fully disabled worker is 70 percent, which is much higher
than the cash replacement rates of between 40 percent and 50 percent that Autor and
Duggan (2003) estimate for US workers with median earnings.
In order to explain the cohort discontinuity in the 1993 DI reform, we first describe
how the Dutch disability insurance system determined eligibility and replacement
rates prior to the reform. Before 1993, the remaining earnings capacity was determined by the following procedure. First, a medical doctor examined the applicant
and compiled a list of work activities that, according to the doctor’s judgment, the
applicant could still perform.5 Second, using a dictionary of occupations that specified for each occupation the required education level and work activities, a list of
occupations that an applicant could still perform was compiled, but occupations that
were more than two “education levels” (on a seven-level scale) below the education
level required for the applicant’s previous occupation were excluded. Finally, if the
list contained at least five suitable occupations with at least ten active workers in
the applicant’s region,6 then the mean wage of the five highest-paying occupations
on the list was taken as the applicant’s potential earnings capacity. The loss of earnings due to the disability, measured by the difference between the prior earnings
and the potential earnings capacity, determined the individual’s disability rating, or
“degree of disability.” If it was not possible to specify five suitable occupations with
at least ten workers, the degree of disability was set at 100 percent. The measured
disability ratings were grouped into eight categories varying from 0–15 percent to
80–100 percent, and these categories determined the replacement rate (see Table 1).
The replacement rate was applied to the individual’s indexed previous earnings,
where the previous earnings were subject to a cap (about €36,000/year in 1999).
Individuals on DI had an earnings exemption equal to their capped indexed previous earnings times the degree they were not disabled (which was set at 100 percent
minus the lower bound of their degree-of-disability category). If a DI beneficiary
chose to work and had earnings above this exemption, the person’s DI benefits were
reduced in the short term and disability rating adjusted in the longer term (typically after about three years).7 Because adjustments due to earnings exceeding the
The list includes 27 physical activities (such as “lifting,” “kneeling,” and “ability to deal with temperature
fluctuations”) and 10 psychological abilities (such as “ability to work under time pressure,” “ability to perform
monotonous work,” and “ability to deal with conflict”).
6
The Netherlands was divided up into five regions and 16 “start regions.” Alternative occupations had to be
found in the “start regions” first. The labor market expert could only look for occupations in neighboring regions
(within one of the main five regions) if the start region contained fewer than five suitable occupations.
7
In the short term, DI benefits are paid assuming the person’s degree of disability is reclassified based on his
current earnings, but the reclassification does not formally happen because the higher level of earnings is not yet
considered sufficient evidence of a lasting increase in earnings capacity. Instead, the actual reclassification only
happens if the person has exceeded the earnings cap for three years, at which point the increase in earnings capacity is considered lasting. Because 1999 is less than three years after the reexaminations took place for the cohorts
relevant to our analysis, the disability ratings in 1999 do not depend on endogenous reactions to the reexaminations.
5
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Table 1—Relation between Degree of Disability and Replacement Rates
Range for degree of disability
(percentages)
[80, 100]
[65, 80)
[55, 65)
[45, 55)
[35, 45)
[25, 35)
[15, 25)
[ 0, 15)

Replacement rate
(percent of last earned wage):
70
50.75
42
35
28
21
14
0

Notes: See text for a description of how the degree of disability is determined. Disability insurance benefit levels are determined as a percentage of the last earned wage and adjusted for
inflation over time.
Source: UWV (2006). UWV is the abbreviation of the agency that administers all social insurance for employees in the Netherlands.

exemption amount took place independently of reexaminations, the anticipation
of being reexamined provided no special incentive for individuals to adjust their
earnings.
The DI reforms of 1993 tightened this procedure in two respects. First, the determination of disability had to be based on objective medical information. In other
words, the applicant needed to have a clearly observable and functional work limitation, as well as a plausible and direct relationship between the functional work
limitation and the medical diagnosis. Second, the criteria for the list of qualifying alternative occupations were relaxed: (i) occupations more than two education
levels below the applicant’s education level were included from 1993 on, (ii) the
list only needed to contain three qualifying alternative occupations (rather than
five), and (iii) the geographic region in which these occupations had to exist with at
least ten active workers was expanded roughly threefold.8 The remaining earnings
capacity was henceforth determined by the three highest-paying occupations on the
list. If these changes affected the remaining earnings capacity, they increased it,
thereby decreasing the disability rating. The average of the highest-paying occupations must weakly rise as occupations were added the list. The average of the three
highest-paying occupations is, by definition, weakly higher than the average of the
five highest-paying occupations. Finally, the expanded list made it less likely that
the list would not contain at least the minimum number (now three) of occupations
needed to avoid declaring the applicant as fully disabled. As a result, for any given
individual, the disability rating under the new criteria is always weakly lower than
the disability rating this individual would have received under the old criteria.9 This
means that no individual would have received a higher replacement rate under the
8
Now, all suitable occupations within the main region (out of five main regions) where the individual is residing
are used to calculate the potential earnings capacity.
9
Another important change of the 1993 DI reform was the introduction of an age- and duration-dependent
benefit for new applicants. To those already receiving disability benefits as of August 1993 (i.e., the group that we
are studying here), these changes did not apply and the benefit level remained a function of the indexed previous
earnings.
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new criteria than what this individual would have received if the old criteria had
been used.
A reduction of the disability rating mechanically increased the earnings exemption. However, the net effect was still that, at any given level of earnings, DI benefits
calculated under the new procedure were the same as or lower than DI benefits
calculated under the old procedure. In other words, an individual’s budget set under
the new procedure was weakly dominated by the budget set faced by this same individual under the old procedure. It is important to note that the size of the benefit cut
was not uniform across people, and we explore the heterogeneity in benefit reductions below.
The new procedure for determining benefits was applied to new DI applicants
as well as to existing DI claimants who were 50 or younger at the time the reform
went into effect. Because reexaminations of existing claimants are time-consuming,
these reexaminations were scheduled to take place by cohort over a period of several years. Disability claimants who were age 34 or younger on the August 1, 1993
were reexamined in 1994, the 35–40-year-old cohort in 1995, the 41–44-year-old
cohort in 1996–1997, and the 45–50-year-old cohort in 1997–2001. However, on
November 12, 1996, a parliamentary motion was passed stipulating that the age
45–50 cohort would be reexamined based on the previous and more generous procedure for determining replacement rates. This motion generated a discontinuity
between the under-45 cohorts and the 45+ cohorts in the generosity of DI, and we
exploit this discontinuity to estimate the effects of a decrease in DI generosity on
the behavior of existing DI recipients.10 We note that we estimate the effect of a
discontinuity in DI generosity in a context were everyone was reexamined (both the
under-45 and the 45+ cohorts). If there is an interaction effect between a change in
DI generosity and being reexamined, the effect of a change DI generosity on labor
supply and social support substitution would be different in a context without any
reexaminations.
II. Data

A. Data Sources
This paper uses administrative data that Statistics Netherlands has assembled
from several sources. These data are merged at the individual level by using a
so-called RIN-number (a coded version of the Dutch equivalent of the US Social
Security number).11
We have administrative data (AO) on all disability benefit recipients aged 15–64
in the Netherlands for the period 1995–2005. The data were collected by the organizations responsible for administering disability benefits and they contain the start
and end dates of a disability spell, the disability rating (in categories), disability
10
Because the discontinuity in the stringency of disability reform applies to existing recipients, we can estimate
the effects of this discontinuity only for those who were receiving disability insurance at the time the reform went
into effect. Our setting does not allow us to estimate effects stemming from people who would have flowed into DI
under the less stringent rules but not under the more stringent rules.
11
Researchers can use these data via a remote-access computer after signing a confidentiality agreement.
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b enefit payments, earnings prior to the DI spell, and the reason for the termination of the disability spell. However, the data do not contain reliable or consistent
information about industry or about the medical condition that gave rise to the disability spell.
We obtained the demographic characteristics of the disability claimants from the
municipal registries (GBA), which contain all residents of the Netherlands. This
database includes information on each person’s month and year of birth, marital
status, number of children, national origin, and place of residence, as well as the
identification numbers (RIN-codes) of their partners. The RIN-codes of the partners
allow us to merge in data on income sources of the partner. We collected the demographic characteristics as of January 1996, which is the start of our sample period.
Finally, we obtained information on labor market earnings and sources of social
assistance income other than DI by merging five administrative datasets: earnings
of all employees, self-employment earnings, unemployment benefits (WW), general
assistance (Bijstand), and receipt of any other form of social assistance (from about
30 relatively minor programs). Data on social assistance come from the organizations that administer these programs. Information about the earnings from paid
labor and self-employment are gathered by Statistics Netherlands using information
from the tax authorities and social insurance records. All these files are available
from 1999 onward, which is why 1999 is the start year for our empirical analysis.
Unemployment insurance covers any income loss due to unemployment for a duration of up to five years, where the duration depends on one’s work history. General
assistance is unlimited in duration and does not require dependents (unlike the US
welfare program), but it is means tested. Apart from the programs mentioned here,
there are no additional cash social assistance programs in the Netherlands that are
relevant for individuals in the age range of our sample. Exact variable definitions are
provided in online Appendix B.
B. Sample Definition
In our baseline analysis, we restrict the sample to all individuals (i) who received
disability benefits on August 1, 1993, (ii) who were between the ages of 42.5 and
47.5 at that date, and (iii) who were still on DI as of January 1, 1996. The first restriction is necessary because the discontinuity in benefit rules only applied to existing
claimants on the date the reform went into effect. The second restriction limits the
sample to cohorts close to the age where the discontinuity in benefit rules occurs.
We selected the bandwidth of +/− 2.5 years based on the criterion by Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012).12 The last restriction is driven by data availability. While our
data on disability start in 1995, the information in the 1995 file does not contain
earnings prior to DI, so we use the files from 1996 onward instead. Thus, we can
only observe individuals who were on disability at the time the reform legislation
was passed if they remained on disability until January of 1996 or later. We believe
12
The Imbens-Kalyanaraman criterion yields different optimal bandwidths for different outcome variables.
Rather than changing the sample for each outcome variable, we selected a bandwidth in the middle of the range
suggested by the Imbens-Kalyanaraman criterion, and applied this bandwidth to all our specifications.

Vol. 6 No. 4

Borghans et al.: Social Support Substitution

43

it highly unlikely that differential attrition occurred around the age discontinuity
prior to January of 1996, as the reexaminations for the individuals in our sample did
not start until later in 1996 and the government decided only in November of 1996
that the age 45+ cohort would not be subject to the new, more stringent criteria.13
Hence, only after the start of our sample period did DI recipients become aware
of the discontinuity in benefit generosity that we exploit in our analysis. A plot of
the density of disability claimants by cohort is relatively smooth and further alleviates any concerns about differential attrition prior to the start of our sample period
(see online Appendix Figure A1). The plot also indicates that heaping-induced bias
(Barreca, Lindo, and Waddell 2011) is not a concern and that there is no discontinuity in the density around the cutoff age of 45 ( p-value of 0.126 in the McCrary 2008
density test). We end our sample in 2005 because DI was fundamentally reformed
in 2006.
We exclude all individuals who appeared on more than one disability record in
our data in a given month (about 3 percent of the sample). We exclude these observations because it is not clear whether they reflect administrative/coding errors or
whether they truly concern individuals who are entitled to multiple different disability insurance benefits. We have checked that no discontinuity occurs at age 45 in the
likelihood that an individual has more than one disability record. Therefore, we are
not concerned that the omission or inclusion of the 3 percent of observations with
multiple records would substantively affect our results. After these sample restrictions, our baseline sample contains 84,185 observations.
C. Summary Statistics
Table 2 presents summary statistics for our key variables. Panel A shows the characteristics of our sample measured as of January 1996 (before the reexaminations
took place). About one-third of disability claimants are female and about two-thirds
are married. The average DI spell started in 1985. Thus, when the reform was implemented in 1996–1998 for the cohorts in our sample, the average claimant in our data
had been on DI for more than a decade. About two-thirds of the sample is classified
as fully disabled (earnings capacity reduction of 80 percent or more) and is therefore
eligible for a replacement rate of 70 percent. The fraction fully disabled is markedly higher among females than among males. Only about 4 percent of the sample is considered to have lost between 55 percent and 80 percent of their earnings
capacity. The remaining 30 percent of the sample is considered to have lost between
15 percent and 55 percent of their earnings capacity and is eligible for replacement
rates between 14 percent and 35 percent. The last two columns of Table 2 compare
the under-45 cohort to the 45+ cohort. Their sample means are reasonably similar.
Of course, our RD (regression discontinuity) design allows for smooth differences
in characteristics by cohort. Only discontinuities in characteristics at the age cutoff
would be problematic, and we will test for such discontinuities in the next section.

13

Please note that we refer to cohorts by their age as of August 1, 1993.
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Table 2—Descriptive Statistics
Full
sample

Females

Age
42.50–44.99

Panel A. Sample characteristics, measured prior to reexamination
0.34
0.00
Female (0=no; 1=yes)
0.66
0.69
Married (0=no; 1=yes)
Age on August 1, 1993
45.18
45.19
1985.1
1984.8
Start date of DI spell (year)

1.00
0.61
45.18
1985.7

0.34
0.65
43.70
1985.3

0.34
0.67
46.27
1985.0

8.85
11.96
8.75
6.32
2.22
2.41
59.50

5.36
4.74
3.28
4.74
1.60
1.11
79.17

9.70
10.73
6.98
5.37
1.97
1.93
63.32

6.12
8.61
6.85
6.10
2.04
2.00
68.28

91.68
44.78
0.20
14.63
3.66

91.89
18.03
0.30
16.68
4.39

87.25
39.14
0.37
17.83
4.24

95.18
33.18
0.13
13.41
3.66

Degree of disability (percent of earnings capacity lost):
7.67
[15–25)
9.53
[25–35)
6.91
[35–45)
5.78
[45–55)
2.01
[55–65)
1.97
[65–80)
66.10
[80–100]

Males

Age
45.00–47.49

Panel B. Outcomes after reexamination
Labor market status in 1999 (percent):
91.75
Still on DI (on the original spell)
Employed
35.75
0.23
Reentry in DI (new spell)
Other social assistance
15.32
3.91
Zero income (dummy for no formal income)
Labor market status in 2005 (percent):
81.01
Still on DI (on the original spell)
Employed
28.84
4.62
Reentry in DI (new spell)
Other social assistance
21.44
8.46
Zero income (dummy for no formal income)
Income by source in 1999, €/year (including zeros):
DI from original DI spell
10,296
Earnings
5,916
New DI spell
25
Other social assistance
924

80.04
36.36
4.33
23.28
8.97

82.91
14.09
5.18
17.84
7.46

76.63
33.03
5.50
20.83
8.39

84.34
25.67
3.95
21.91
8.51

11,135
7,753
22
839

8,649
2,309
31
1,089

9,299
6,500
39
1,060

11,054
5,471
15
820

11,731
17,045
10,715
6,080

12,732
17,814
11,105
5,811

9,785
13,282
10,206
6,543

11,201
17,118
10,568
6,008

12,098
16,979
11,027
6,153

12,343
7,136
624
1,231

9,611
2,145
606
1,501

10,351
6,485
692
1,233

12,235
4,666
561
1,389

Income by source in 1999, €/year (if nonzero):
DI from original DI spell
Earnings
New DI spell
Other social assistance

Income by source in 2005, €/year (including zeros):
DI from original DI spell
11,421
Earnings
5,452
New DI spell
618
Other social assistance
1,322
Income by source in 2005, €/year (if nonzero):
DI from original DI spell
Earnings
New DI spell
Other social assistance

14,491
20,136
13,376
6,185

15,887
20,889
14,390
5,307

11,862
16,308
11,709
8,433

13,920
20,822
14,204
5,951

14,884
19,460
12,593
6,353

Observations

84,185

55,772

28,413

36,362

47,823

Notes: Since we have information available from 1996 onward, both marital status and degree of disability are
recorded in January 1996 (before the reexaminations). Age is measured as of August 1, 1993, so age is a measure
for cohort.
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Panel B presents the means of our key outcome variables. We only present the
values for 1999 and 2005 in the interest of space. In 1999, about one to three years
after the reexaminations took place for the age cohorts in our sample, 92 percent
of those on DI at the start of 1996 were still on DI (where being on DI in 1999 is
defined as having received positive income from DI in that year). About 36 percent
of our sample was working, defined as having positive earnings (including those
from self-employment) in 1999, which is consistent with DI also covering partial
disability in the Netherlands. Of those who had left DI, 53 percent were employed,
whereas 33 percent of those on DI were employed; thus, a considerable number
combined DI receipt with work. The fraction of men working (45 percent) was more
than twice as high as the fraction of females with positive earnings (18 percent).
Fifteen percent of our sample also had social assistance income other than DI in
1999. Another 4 percent were not observed in any of our administrative files. Most
of these individuals did not have any formal labor or social assistance income in
1999, but about one-third of them died or emigrated during our sample period.14
In 1999, the average income in our sample was about €17,000, of which roughly
two-thirds came from DI benefits, with the remaining third coming mostly from
earnings. Income from other social assistance programs accounted only for about
6 percent of total income. In 2005, about seven to nine years after the reexaminations, 81 percent of those on DI at the start of 1996 were still on DI. Between 1999
and 2005, the fraction employed fell from 36 percent to 29 percent, and the fraction with income from social assistance other than DI increased from 15 percent to
21 percent. These trends are consistent with the general decline in labor force participation in the Netherlands as people approach retirement. In 2005, about two-thirds
of total income in our sample still came from DI benefits.
III. Results

A. Magnitude of the Reform
To what extent did the more stringent reexaminations reduce the generosity of the
DI program for the under-45 cohort? The answer to this question allows us to interpret the magnitude of the effects of the reform on earnings and on receipt of other
forms of social assistance. Figure 1 shows three measures by which to gauge the
magnitude of the reform: the effect on benefit amounts, the effect on replacement
rates, and the effect on participation in the DI program.
Panel A plots annual disability benefit amounts by cohort in 1999, including zeros
for those who exited. Visually, there is a clear discontinuity at the cutoff age. We
estimate the size of this discontinuity by running an OLS regression of the outcome
variable on a treatment dummy that equals 1 for cohorts subject to the more stringent reexaminations (i.e., age less than 45), a linear term in age, and an interaction
14

About 1.1 percent of our sample had died by 1999 and 0.3 percent had emigrated. These observations are
included in the main analysis and their income and participation variables are all set to zero in 1999. Results are
extremely similar if we exclude these observations altogether. The discontinuity in the stringency of the reexamination had no significant impact on the probability of death or the probability of emigration.
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Panel A. Effect on DI benefit amount

Estimate of the discontinuity: −1.076 (0.096)***

DI benefit in 1999
(1,000 €/yr)
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Panel B. Effect on the DI replacement rate
Estimate of the discontinuity: −0.059 (0.003)***

Replacement rate
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Panel C. Effect on participation in DI

Estimate of the discontinuity: −0.038 (0.004)***
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Figure 1. Magnitude of the Reform
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each figure is based on 84,185 observations. The
dotted lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates come from
reduced-form RD regressions without demographic control variables.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
   * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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of the treatment dummy with the variable [age−45]. All ages are specified as of
August 1, 1993, so they effectively measure cohorts. We run this specification for all
RD estimates reported in the figures in the paper. The fitted regression line is indicated in the plot, and the RD estimate on the treatment dummy is −1.076, indicating
that the more stringent reexaminations for the younger cohort reduced their annual
DI benefits by €1,076, or about 10 percent. All reduced-form RD estimates can be
seen as local average treatment effects—local in the sense that they only apply at
the discontinuity (i.e., for the cohort turning 45 on August 1, 1993) and average
in the sense that it is the average effect for all those at the discontinuity. The key
identifying assumption behind all of our RD estimates is that the only discontinuous change at the age cutoff is the stringency of the DI reexaminations. While we
cannot test this assumption, we know of no other policy changes that would create a
discontinuity at this cutoff. Further, when we run our reduced-form RD specification
using all of our demographic characteristics as dependent variables, only 2 out of
the 39 regression coefficients are significant.15 Moreover, the RD coefficients in the
placebo regressions are jointly insignificant ( p -value: 0.4990).
Panel B of Figure 1 shows that the replacement rate, including zeros for those who
exited, is 5.9 percentage points lower for the affected cohort at the discontinuity.16
The average replacement rate for those who just escaped the more stringent reexaminations is 0.55; the 5.9-percentage-point drop therefore represents an 11 percent
decline. Panel C shows that the fraction of the sample that is still on the original
DI spell in 1999 falls discontinuously by 3.8 percentage points at the age cutoff.
Overall, Figure 1 shows that the more stringent reexaminations roughly translate
into a 10 percent benefit reduction, though it should be kept in mind that the size of
the benefit cut was not uniform across individuals. The effects of the reform on labor
supply and other benefit receipt should be viewed in light of this magnitude.
Given that the benefit cuts were not uniform, we want to determine whose benefits
were reduced by the reform. In other words, we want to describe the demographic
composition of those who would not experience a reduction in their disability rating
(and, thus, benefits) under the less stringent reexamination, but do experience such a
reduction under the more stringent reexamination. Following standard IV terminology, we refer to this group as the compliers.17 Because the definition of compliers is
based on a counterfactual outcome, the demographic characteristics of the compliers cannot simply be measured. However, as detailed in online Appendix A, we can

15
The full results are presented in online Appendix Table A1. It would be instructive to do similar checks on
the identification strategy with our key outcome variables: labor income and income from other social assistance
programs. Unfortunately, we do not have data on these variables prior to 1999.
16
The data do not contain the post-reform replacement rate for those who exited from the DI administration.
Based on discussions with the DI administration and based on the economic incentives faced by beneficiaries, our
understanding is that most exits occurred for those who were no longer eligible for DI. In particular, beneficiaries
who had their benefits reduced to zero because of excess earnings could nevertheless stay in the DI administration with a positive disability rating (and, therefore, a nonzero nominal replacement rate) for about three years.
Individuals had an incentive to do so because it gave them the option of receiving future DI benefits without having
to requalify if their earnings would fall back. However, we cannot completely rule out that some of those who exited
from the DI administration were still eligible for a positive replacement rate.
17
Although the term complier is standard IV terminology, it is somewhat counterintuitive in our setting, as
“compliance” in our setting is determined by the procedure that translates the results of the reexamination into
benefit levels rather than by decisions on the part of the DI recipient.
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infer the demographic characteristics of compliers by exploiting regression discontinuities in demographic characteristics within the subsample of individuals who
experienced a drop in replacement rates. We estimate that 13 percent of the sample
consists of compliers. We find that, among compliers, the fraction who are female
is 13 percentage points lower than the entire sample, the fraction who are fully
disabled is 19 percentage points lower, and the fraction who are married is 13 percentage points higher (full results are in online Appendix Table A2). All of these
differences are statistically significant. Thus, male, partially disabled, and married
individuals were more likely to experience a reduction in their benefits than the
sample as a whole. In line with these findings, we later split estimates out by gender,
by degree of disability, and by marital status (in Tables 6 and A7).
Because we do not have income measures from before the reform, we cannot estimate the effects of the reform on income from labor and from other social assistance
programs separately for those staying on DI and for those leaving DI.18 However,
we do have the replacement rate prior to the reexamination, which allows us to
examine heterogeneity in the effects of the reform on replacement rates.
The first column of Table 3 shows the change in replacement rates at age 45.0 for
those subject to the less stringent reexamination.19 About 72 percent of this group
saw no change in their replacement rate, 12 percent experienced an increase in their
replacement rate, and 16 percent faced a decrease in their replacement rate. The
second column shows the change in replacement rates at age 45.0 for those who
underwent the more stringent reexamination. A much larger fraction (29 percent)
in this latter group experienced a reduction in their replacement rate, and a much
lower fraction (5 percent) saw an increase in their replacement rate. Still, even in the
group subject to the more stringent reexamination, about two-thirds experienced no
change in their replacement rate. The third column shows the treatment effect of the
more stringent reexamination on the change in replacement rate, which is simply the
difference between the first two columns. This column shows a downward shift in
probability mass throughout the distribution of changes in replacement rates, showing that the reexamination made DI less generous throughout the distribution. Using
the estimates of the causal effects of the more stringent reexamination on the full
transition matrix of replacement rates (presented in online Appendix Table A3), we
find that 70 percent of the reductions in replacement rates caused by the more stringent reexamination occurred among people who remained eligible for DI and that
18
We do have covered earnings (but not income) prior to the start of the DI spell. Even though these earnings
are, on average, more than a decade old and capped, we will later use them to get a rough sense of the heterogeneity
of the impact of the more stringent reform on living standards.
19
We run our standard reduced-form RD specification using dummies for each possible change in the replacement rate as the dependent variables. We estimate changes in the replacement rate at age 45.0 for those subject to
the less stringent reexamination as the intercept of the right segment of the regression line at age 45.0. Changes in
replacement rate for those subject to the more stringent reexamination are estimated by the intercept of the left segment of the regression line at age 45.0. More detailed estimates are provided in online Appendix Table A3, which
presents the joint distribution of the replacement rate in 1996 (pre-reform) and 1999 (post-reform) at age 45.0 for
those who were subject to the less stringent reexamination rules, as well as the impact of the reform on these joint
probabilities (estimated by the RD effect). For example, the table shows that the more stringent reexaminations
raised the fraction of fully disabled removed from the program from 9.2 percent (= 6.14/66.93) to 11.8 percent
(= (6.14 + 1.75)/66.93). The estimates in Table 3 summarize all joint probabilities of online Appendix Table A3
by presenting the sums of the diagonal entries of the Appendix table.
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Table 3—Reexaminations and the Change in the Replacement Rate between 1996 and 1999

Change in the
replacement rate
7 “steps” less generous
6 “steps” less generous
5 “steps” less generous
4 “steps” less generous
3 “steps” less generous
2 “steps” less generous
1 “step” less generous
Same generosity
1 “step” more generous
2 “steps” more generous
3 “steps” more generous
4 “steps” more generous
5 “steps” more generous
6 “steps” more generous

Predicted probability
at age 45.0 for the
less stringent
reexamination
(1)

Predicted probability
at age 45.0 for the
more stringent
reexamination
(2)

Treatment effect of the more
stringent examination on the
probability of the specified
change in replacement rate
(3)

6.14
0.46
0.85
1.08
1.09
2.17
3.94
72.17
3.52
1.46
1.57
1.87
2.13
1.54

7.89
1.56
2.41
2.25
2.30
3.69
8.99
65.52
1.40
0.67
0.90
0.91
0.85
0.66

1.75 (0.35)
1.09 (0.10)
1.56 (0.13)
1.17 (0.14)
1.21 (0.16)
1.52 (0.21)
5.06 (0.29)
−6.65 (0.59)
−2.12 (0.18)
−0.79 (0.12)
−0.66 (0.14)
−0.96 (0.14)
−1.28 (0.15)
−0.89 (0.12)

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each row is estimated using our standard reduced-form RD regression
without demographic controls, where the outcome variable is a dummy for the change in the replacement rate
between 1996 and 1999 that corresponds to row header. There are eight possible replacement rates (in percentages): 0, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 50.75, and 70, where we assign 0 to those who exit from DI before the postexamination replacement rate is recorded. The number of “steps” counts by how many distinct levels the replacement rate
changed. For example, going to the next higher replacement rate (e.g., from 28 percent to 35 percent) is called
a “1 step” increase in the generosity of the replacement rate. Column 1 shows the intercept at age 45.0 from the
regression line to the right of the discontinuity (i.e., for those who underwent the less stringent reexamination), column 2 shows the intercept at age 45.0 from the regression line to the left of the discontinuity (i.e., for those who
underwent the more stringent reexamination), and column 3 shows the treatment effect (i.e., the difference between
columns 1 and 2). N=84,185. Age is measured as of August 1, 1993, so age is a measure for cohort.

the remaining 30 percent occurred among those who lost eligibility. These figures
remain similar if we weight the causal effects on the reductions by the size of the
reduction rather than by the number of people experiencing them.
As an additional partial check on our identifying assumption that no factors
besides the DI reexaminations had a discontinuous impact at age 45, Figure 2 reports
DI exit rates separately for 1995, 1996/1997, 1998, and 1999. Exit is defined as the
end date of the original DI spell, as recorded in the administrative data file, occurring during the year in question. We calculate these rates as fractions of DI claimants
in our sample on January 1, 1996.20 Since no reexaminations took place in 1995
for DI claimants in the age 40+ cohorts, a discontinuity at age 45 in the 1995 exit
rate would invalidate our identifying assumption. Reassuringly, the 1995 exit rate
shows no sign of a discontinuity at age 45. In 1996 and 1997, the age 40–44 cohort
was reexamined as well as part of the age 45 cohort. In precisely these years, the
discontinuity at age 45 is very pronounced. In 1998, the remainder of the age 45
cohort and some of the age 46 cohort were reexamined, which explains the statistically significant discontinuity in the opposite direction. This discontinuity, however,
is much smaller in size than those in other years because the age 45+ cohort was
reexamined under the older and less stringent standards. Hence, if we calculate the

20

However, the exit rate for 1995 is calculated as a fraction of DI recipients as of January 1, 1995.
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Panel A. Exit in 1995

Estimate of the discontinuity: 0.001 (0.002)
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Panel B. Exit in 1996/1997
Estimate of the discontinuity: 0.051 (0.003)***
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Panel C. Exit in 1998 Figure 2. Exit from DI by Year (Continued )
Estimate of the discontinuity: −0.012 (0.002)***
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total exit rate over the 1996–1998 period, we find a discontinuous increase in exit for
the group subject to the more stringent reexaminations. In 1999, all the reexaminations for the age 44–45 cohort were completed, and we find no discontinuity in exit
rates at the age cutoff.
B. Reduced-Form Impacts on Labor Market and Social Assistance Outcomes
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ary savings14only occur to the extent that benefits in other programs are lower than
DI benefits.12
In the latter case, increased earnings are an indication of moral hazard
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disability recipients. In this subsection, we examine labor market
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and social assistance outcomes in 1999 (about two years after the reexaminations
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took place),2 which is the first year for which we have the required data. In subsection IIIF, we0 will examine the effects over a longer horizon.
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The first panel of Figure 3 plots income from social assistance other than DI by
cohort. The figure shows an upward jump in income from other social assistance
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Estimate of the discontinuity: −0.012 (0.002)***

Panel D. Exit in 1999
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Figure 2. Exit from DI by Year (Continued )
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dotted lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals. The exit rate is defined as a fraction of our sample in January 1996, except for
panel A where it is a fraction of the sample in January 1995. Regression estimates come from
reduced-form RD regressions without demographic control variables.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
   * Significant at the 10 percent level.

programs for the cohort that underwent the more stringent reexamination. In fact,
the RD regression estimates that the more stringent reexamination increased other
social assistance income by €305 per year. The second panel shows that the fraction receiving any social assistance income from a source other than DI discontinuously increases by 4.6 percentage points at the age cutoff for the more stringent
reexaminations. Both increases are highly significant and represent an increase of
about one-third in relative terms. In other words, we find clear evidence of substitution of other forms of social assistance for DI benefits.
Do people who leave DI fully account for the increased income from other social
assistance programs, or do those who remain on DI also receive more income from
other social assistance programs? To answer this question, we first note that there
are two types of individuals who exited from DI: (i) those who exited from DI under
the more stringent reexamination but would not have exited from DI under the less
stringent reexamination (marginal leavers) and (ii) those who would have exited
anyway (inframarginal leavers). Panel C of Figure 1 allows us to determine the
population fractions of marginal and inframarginal leavers. Just to the right of the
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Social assistance income in 1999 (€/yr)

Panel A. Other social assistance income in 1999
Estimate of the discontinuity: 305 (50)***
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Estimate of the discontinuity: 0.046 (0.005)***
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Figure 3. Effects of DI Reform on Social Assistance Other than Disability Insurance
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Figures are based on 84,185 observations. The dotted lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals. Social Assistance Income excludes any
benefits from DI (both from the original spell or any new spell). Similarly, Social Assistance
Participation excludes participation in DI. Regression estimates come from regressions without demographic control variables.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
   * Significant at the 10 percent level.

age discontinuity, individuals faced the less stringent reexamination and all leavers
are therefore inframarginal leavers by definition. The DI participation rate just to the
right of the age continuity is 93.2 percent (see panel C of Figure 1), so 6.8 percent
(= 100 − 93.2) of individuals are inframarginal leavers. Individuals just to the left
of the age discontinuity faced the more stringent reexamination, so leavers just to
the left consist of both inframarginal and marginal leavers. The participation rate
just to the left of the discontinuity is 89.4 percent, which implies that inframarginal
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and marginal leavers combined comprise 10.6 percent (= 100 − 89.4) of the population. Hence, marginal leavers make up 3.8 percent (= 10.6 − 6.8). This means
that 35.8 p ercent (= 3.8/10.6) of all leavers to the left of the discontinuity are marginal leavers and 64.2 percent are inframarginal leavers.
We note that inframarginal leavers cannot be responsible for the jump in social
assistance receipt observed in panel A of Figure 3, because inframarginal leavers,
by definition, are not affected by an increase in the stringency of the reexamination (they would have exited in any case). So, to the extent that this jump is caused
by leavers, it must be caused by marginal leavers. To find the degree to which
this jump can be attributed to marginal leavers, we rerun the RD regression of
panel A of Figure 3, but now on the subsample of those who left DI. The resulting regression line (not shown) just to the right of the age cutoff lies at €1,962
of other social assistance income per year. Because just to the right of the age
cutoff all leavers are inframarginal by definition, this implies that other social
assistance income is equal to €1,962 per year for inframarginal leavers. Just to
the left of the age cutoff, where we have both marginal and inframarginal leavers,
the regression line lies at €2,564 per year. Thus, the weighted average of income
from other social assistance programs for all leavers to the left of the discontinuity must equal €2,564, which implies that income from other social assistance for
marginal leavers must have been €3,644 per year (so that 35.8 percent of €3,644
plus 64.2 percent of €1,962 equals €2,564). If marginal leavers receive €3,644 per
year from other social assistance, the maximum amount by which their income
from other social assistance programs could have possibly increased due to the
more stringent reexamination is €3,644. Given that marginal leavers comprise
only 3.8 percent of the entire sample (so both stayers and leavers) at the age cutoff, they can, at most, account for an increase of 0.038 × 3,644 = €138 in the RD
estimate of €305/year that we found for the entire sample. Thus, we conclude that
those leaving DI altogether can be responsible for at most 43 percent (= 138/305)
of the overall jump in income from other social assistance programs, and that at
least 57 percent must be due to increases in other social assistance income among
those remaining on DI.
In Figure 4, we examine the extent to which individuals subject to the stricter
reexaminations were more likely to receive income from new DI spells. In 1999, this
occurred only to a minimal extent. Among those facing the more stringent reexamination, annual income from new DI spells is a statistically insignificant €8 higher.
The participation rate in new DI spells is 0.2 percentage points higher, which is
statistically significant but still small relative to the 3.8 percent of DI recipients who
were induced to leave due to the more stringent reexamination. As we will show
below, reentry into DI becomes more important over time.
Next, we present the reduced-form effects of the more stringent reexamination
on labor market outcomes. The first panel of Figure 5 plots earnings (including
self-employment income) in 1999 by cohort. The figure shows a discontinuity in
earnings at the cutoff age, but the discontinuity is not as visually compelling as in
the earlier figures. The RD regression estimates that earnings are €624 per year
higher at the cutoff age for those who were subject to the more stringent reexamination, and this estimate is highly significant. The €624 increase represents an
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Income in 1999 from new DI spell (€/yr)

Panel A. Income in 1999 from new DI spell
Estimate of the discontinuity: 8 (9)
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Figure 4. Effects of DI Reform on Reentry into DI
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Figures are based on 84,185 observations. The dotted lines represent the 95-percent confidence intervals. Only DI income and participation in
DI that originate from spells that started after the reexamination are included in this figure.
Regression estimates come from regressions without demographic control variables.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
   * Significant at the 10 percent level.

11 percent increase in annual earnings. This figure establishes our qualitative finding that disability income crowds out labor income. It also contributes to the literature on the labor supply disincentive effects of disability insurance by showing
clear evidence of labor supply responses among prime-age DI recipients who are
long-term recipients of DI (durations of at least two years at the time of the reform,
but of ten years on average). We will discuss the economic magnitude of the labor
supply response in the next subsection.
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Panel A. Effect on earnings in 1999

Estimate of the discontinuity: 624 (154)***
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Estimate of the discontinuity: 0.029 (0.007)***
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Figure 5. Effects of DI Reform on Labor Market Outcomes
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Figures are based on 84,185 observations. The
dotted lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals. Employment is defined as having
positive earnings from employment or self-employment. Regression estimates come from
reduced-form RD regressions without demographic control variables.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
   * Significant at the 10 percent level.

Because we do not have earnings for prior years, we cannot precisely determine the extent to which the average increase in earnings stems from nonworkers
finding employment (extensive margin) or from workers increasing their earnings
(intensive margin). However, at least some of the increase comes from the extensive
margin because the second panel of Figure 5 shows a clear discontinuity in the fraction of individuals with strictly positive income from wages or self-employment.
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The RD regression estimates that the more stringent reexamination caused the fraction employed to increase by 2.9 percentage points. To explain the observed increase
in earnings in the absence of an intensive-margin labor supply response, average
earnings for those who started working would need to be €21,500 (= 624/0.029)
per year, which is higher than the observed average earnings for those with positive
earnings (€17,000 per year). It therefore seems likely that some of the response also
occurred along the intensive margin. When we do a bounding calculation similar to
the one we did above for income from other social benefits, we find that those who
left DI altogether can be responsible for at most 61 percent of the overall jump in
earnings caused by the more stringent reexamination, and that at least 39 percent
must be due to earnings increases among those remaining on DI.
C. Benefit Substitution and Earnings Crowd-Out
Figures 3 and 5 establish that people substitute between DI income and other
forms of social assistance, and that DI benefits crowd out labor income. We now
turn to the economic magnitudes of earnings crowd-out and substitution of social
assistance. In the first column of Table 4, we scale our reduced-form estimates by
the amount by which disability benefits from the original spell decrease at the age
discontinuity, whereas in the second column, we scale by the discontinuity in the
replacement rate. We implement this scaling by running IV regressions following
the standard “fuzzy” RD specification.21 We include a rich set of demographic control variables to increase the precision of the estimates. As should be the case with
a valid RD design, the control variables do not substantially affect the magnitudes
of our estimates (see online Appendix Table A4 for the corresponding estimates
without controls). Given that the reexamination was, in all respects, more stringent for those below the cutoff age, the monotonicity assumption required for the
fuzzy RD design should be satisfied; being subject to a reexamination following
the more stringent new protocol rather than the old protocol weakly decreases the
benefit amount and weakly decreases the replacement rate at any level of earnings
for any given individual (despite the increase in the earnings exemption). We do not
interpret these IV estimates as causal impacts of the level of DI benefits per se or as
causal estimates of the DI replacement rate per se because the reduction in benefits
and replacement rates was not uniform. In fact, the reduction varied across individuals and by earnings level for any given individual. The response to the benefit cuts
is likely not only a function of the level of the cuts, but also of the heterogeneity in
the cuts. We therefore see the IV estimates as a way to relate the magnitudes of the
behavior effects of the reform to alterative measures of the size of the reform. In
other words, we view this primarily as a scaling exercise.
Panel A of Table 4 shows that there is only a minimal increase in income from or
participation in new DI spells in the short term (roughly two years after the reexaminations) in response to the benefit and replacement rate reductions. For example,
for every €1,000 reduction in existing DI benefits, the increased expenditure on new
21
Excellent discussions of the theory and practice of RD methods can be found in Hahn, Todd, and van der
Klaauw (2001), Imbens and Lemieux (2008), and Lee and Lemieux (2010).
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Table 4—Earnings Crowd-Out and Benefit Shifting

Panel A. New DI benefit in 1999
Income from a new DI spell
Participation dummy
Panel B. Other social assistance in 1999
Income from other social assistance
Participation dummy
Panel C. Labor market outcomes in 1999
Earnings
Employment dummy
Panel D. Total
Income except from original DI spell
Dummy for work or other social assistance

Effect scaled by decrease in
amount of original DI
(in 1,000 €/year)

Effect scaled by decrease
in the replacement rate (fraction)

0.008
(0.008)
0.001
(0.001)**

0.142
(0.148)
0.026
(0.011)**

0.297
(0.047)***
0.044
(0.005)***

5.212
(0.787)***
0.778
(0.081)***

0.618
(0.108)***
0.029
(0.005)***

10.848
(1.924)***
0.511
(0.084)***

0.923
(0.113)***
0.057
(0.006)***

16.201
(1.983)***
0.992
(0.092)***

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each entry in the table comes from a separate IV regression based on the
fuzzy RD design. The dependent variable is listed in the rows. Other social assistance income excludes any benefits
from DI (both from the original spell or any new spell). The variable that is instrumented (endogenous explanatory
variable) is listed in the columns. The instrument itself is the treatment dummy (age as of August 1, 1993 less than
45). Earnings and income are measured in thousands of euros per year. The replacement rate is expressed as a fraction. Each regression is based on 84,185 observations. The following controls are used in the regressions: age in
months as of August 1, 1993, [age−45] interacted with the treatment dummy, six dummies for degree of disability in
1996, a cubic polynomial in pre-DI earnings, nine national origin dummies, a dummy for being married in 1996, 39
regional dummies, a cubic polynomial in duration in DI at the start of the reform, a full set of interactions between
the dummies for the degree of disability and the cubic polynomial in pre-DI earnings, a gender dummy, and a full set
of interactions between all previously listed controls and gender. In total, each regression has 163 control variables.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

DI spells is €8 (not significant). Panel B examines the extent to which the reduced
generosity of disability benefits induces individuals to shift to other forms of social
assistance. The first row in column 1 of panel B shows that, for a €1 reduction in
disability benefits, individuals receive €0.30 more from other social assistance programs in 1999. Thus, the benefit-substitution ratio is 0.30. A government not taking this substitution into account would overestimate the reduction in government
expenditure from tightening the DI eligibility rules by 43 percent. The second row
shows that for each €1,000 decrease in annual DI benefits caused by the more stringent rules, the probability that an individual receives income from another social
assistance program increases by 4.4 percentage points. An alternative way of s caling
the degree of substitution between social assistance programs is provided in the
second column, which shows that, for a 10-percentage-point reduction in disability
replacement rates, income from other social assistance programs increases by €521
per year (an increase of more than 50 percent) and the probability of participation in
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other social assistance programs increases by 7.8 percentage points. The estimates
of panel B in Table 4 establish that benefit substitution is not only statistically significant, but also important in economic terms.
Benefit substitution can occur mechanically when individuals automatically
receive more income from other social assistance programs as their DI benefits
decrease. While this might explain some of the substitution, it cannot account for
the entire reaction, because we also observe individuals enrolling in other forms of
social assistance for which enrollment is not automatic. Benefit substitution can also
be a result of the individual actively searching for alternative sources of benefits and
trying to qualify for them. Finally, benefit substitution can occur when caseworkers
steer individuals toward alternative sources of support. We have no direct evidence
on the relative importance of these three channels, but we suspect that all three may
have contributed to the observed amount of benefit substitution to some degree.
The estimate in the first row in column 1 of panel C in Table 4 indicates that, for
each euro of benefits decrease caused by the more stringent reexamination, the more
stringent reexamination induced individuals to increase earnings by €0.62 in 1999.
In other words, we find an earnings crowd-out ratio of 0.62: one euro of DI benefits
crowds out €0.62 of earnings.22 Alternatively, one can scale the change in earnings
by the change in total benefits (including DI benefits) due to the more stringent reexamination. For each euro in decreased DI benefits on the original spell, other benefits
went up by €0.30 and DI benefits on new spells went up by €0.01. Therefore, total
benefits only decreased by €0.69. Thus, per euro decrease in total benefits, earnings
went up by €0.90 (= 0.62/0.69). The second row of panel C examines the extensive
margin response and shows that, per €1,000 of disability benefits decrease caused
by the more stringent reexamination, the probability of being employed in 1999
increases by 2.9 percentage points. The second column presents analogous estimates, but now scaled by the change in replacement rates caused by the more stringent reexamination. We find that, for a t en-percentage-point decrease in replacement
rates, earnings increase by €1,085 per year (or about 19 percent) and the probability
of employment increases by 5.1 percentage points. All four estimates in panel C
are highly statistically significant and establish that the degree to which DI benefits
crowd out labor market earnings and participation is economically meaningful.
In the late 1990s, the Netherlands experienced an economic boom, which likely
made it relatively easy for individuals to increase their labor supply and reduced
incentives to look for other forms of social assistance. As a result, our estimate for
earnings crowd-out may be higher than it would have been during average economic
times, while the estimate of benefit substitution may be lower. During the early
2000s, the Netherlands experienced a recession, and, as we will see in Section IIIF
below, our estimates of earnings crowd-out and benefit substitution remained similar during that period. A further reason why the earnings crowd-out estimate may
be relatively high is that the Netherlands had various policies to foster reintegration
into the labor market.
22
All amounts are gross of tax and social insurance contributions. Both benefits and earnings are subject to
taxation and mandatory social insurance contributions, so we can directly compare changes in income to changes
in benefits.
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DI recipients have an earnings exemption which equals their indexed previous
earnings times the degree to which they were deemed able to work (i.e., one minus
the degree of disability). Any earnings beyond the exemption faced a high implicit
tax rate. Thus, if the reexamination led to a reduction in the disability rating, this
both reduced the DI benefit (an income effect) and increased the earnings exemption
(a substitution effect).23 Therefore, like most of the previous literature on the labor
supply response to DI, we cannot determine the extent to which the response is
driven by the substitution effect or by the income effect.24 However, given the large
magnitude of the earnings reaction (especially if compared to the change in total
benefits), we suspect that incentive effects stemming from the change in the earnings exemption played a large role.
Panel D of Table 4 presents the combined effect of benefit substitution and earnings crowd-out. The estimate in the first row and column indicates that individuals
increased income from other social assistance (including new DI spells) and work
by €0.92 per euro of original DI benefits lost. In other words, on average, individuals almost fully offset the decrease in DI benefits by increasing income from other
sources, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the lost DI was completely offset
( p-value 0.494). Even if the offset is complete, individuals now have to work more
and are worse off to the extent they receive disutility from supplying labor.25 The
second row shows the effect on a dummy for working or receiving income from a
social assistance program other than the original DI spell. We find that per €1,000
decrease in DI, an individual is 5.7 percentage points more likely to obtain income
from a new source. The fact that this estimate is less than the sum of the estimates
in row 2 of panels A, B, and C indicates that some individuals both started working
and started drawing income from other forms of social assistance. In particular, per
€1,000 decrease in DI, individuals became 1.7 (= 0.1 + 4.4 + 2.9 − 5.7) percentage points more likely to have both income from other social assistance programs
and labor income in 1999.
The estimates in Table 4 are based on a piece-wise linear specification with
a bandwidth of +/− 2.5 years around the cutoff age, which is the bandwidth
suggested by applying the Imbens-Kalyanaraman criterion (2012) to our data.
Online Appendix Table A6 explores the sensitivity of our key results to the choice
23
Note, however, that there is no level of earnings at which DI benefits are increased by a reduction in the
disability rating, whereas there is always some level of earnings at which DI benefits are strictly decreased by a
reduction in the disability rating. Thus, despite the increase in the earnings exemption, a reduction in the disability
rating implies a reduction in DI generosity.
24
Important exceptions are Campolieti and Riddell (2012), who show a labor supply response to the increase in
the earnings exemption (a pure substitution effect), and Marie and Vall Castello (2012), who measure a labor supply
response to a pure increase in DI benefits (an income effect).
25
Even if we cannot reject that individuals are, on average, able to fully offset the DI benefit cut, it is conceivable that certain subgroups are not able to do so. To examine this possibility, online Appendix Table A5 compares
current income to earnings (adjusted for general wage growth) prior to the start of the DI spell. To briefly summarize our findings: we find that, on average, 65.9 percent of the sample had a lower income in 1999 than their
earnings prior to DI. The RD estimate indicates that this fraction is a statistically significant 1.4 percentage points
lower for those subject to the more stringent reexamination. Therefore, the more stringent reexamination slightly
increased the fraction experiencing an income increase. On the other hand, 9.9 percent of the sample had an income
in 1999 that was less than 50 percent of earnings prior to DI. This percentage is a statistically significant 1.6 percentage points higher for those subject to the more stringent reexamination. Hence, the effect of the more stringent
reexamination on income changes is heterogeneous. It raises both the fraction experiencing increases in income and
the fraction experiencing sharp drops in income.
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of bandwidth and to the choice of polynomial in the running variable. Overall, the
table indicates that our qualitative results are reasonably robust to the choice of
bandwidth and functional form for the running variable, though the point estimates
do vary a fair amount across specifications.
D. Effects by Income Source, Gender, and Degree of Disability
The first column of panel A of Table 5 splits out the results of the first column
of Table 4 by source of income. Of the increase in benefits, 67 percent came from
increased UI benefits, 10 percent from increased General Assistance, 3 percent
from reentry into DI, and 20 percent from all other types of social support benefits.
The large increase in UI benefits was not automatic, but individuals did build up
“work history” for the purpose of UI benefits while receiving DI (even if not working). We find that increased wage earnings account for 80 percent (= 0.492/0.618)
of the earnings response, while changes in self-employment income account for
20 percent. Given that evasion of wage earnings is hard and limited, this breakdown indicates that the earnings response is unlikely to be largely driven by people
not changing their actual labor supply but simply starting to report their earnings.
Panel B examines receipt of any amount by income sources, and its results are very
similar to the results of panel A.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 split out the results of the first column by gender.
These columns suggest that social support substitution is more predominant among
women. In particular, the point estimate of the benefit-substitution ratio is much
larger for women than for men (0.48 versus 0.26), but this difference is not statistically significant (p -value 0.149). However, the difference is statistically significant if
we look at the participation response for other forms of social assistance. Per €1,000
decrease in DI benefits, women increase their participation in other social assistance
programs by 7.4 percentage points, which is nearly twice the 3.8-percentage-point
increase by men. In response to a given DI benefit cut, women are also significantly
more likely than men to start working, whereas the point estimate of the earnings
response is actually slightly larger for men than for women (but this difference is not
statistically significant). The fact that labor force participation is only 18 percent for
women but 45 percent for men may explain why women experience a larger response
on the extensive margin while total earnings increase slightly more for men because
the scope for an intensive-margin response is larger among men. There is no significant difference in the degree to which men and women are able to offset the decrease
in DI benefits by other sources of income. We cannot determine what exactly drives
differences in the effects on men and women, but we suspect that likely explanations
are differences in initial DI benefit levels, differences in types of disabilities, and
differences in opportunities in the labor market and in household production.
Table 6 analyzes benefit substitution and earnings crowd-out by the degree of
disability into which individuals were classified as of January 1, 1996 (before the
reexaminations took place).26 Panel A of Table 6 shows that the effects on benefits
26
We also investigated whether the benefit-substitution ratio and the labor crowd-out ratio varied by marital
status, previous earnings, duration of the DI spell, and national origin. We found no significant differences along
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from new DI spells are small and do not vary significantly by gender or disability
rating. Panel B shows that social support substitution is much more prevalent among
individuals classified as fully disabled than among those classified as partially disabled. This finding applies both for social assistance benefit amounts and for social
assistance participation, and it holds in the entire sample as well as the subsamples
by gender. These differences are not only statistically significant but also large in
magnitude. The benefit-substitution ratio for the fully disabled is 0.49, which is four
times as large as the ratio of 0.12 for partially disabled recipients. About 90 percent
of this difference in benefit substitution ratios is accounted for by the larger increases
in UI benefits among the fully disabled relative to partially disabled individuals.
In contrast, we find high rates of earnings crowd-out both for those classified
as partially disabled and for those classified as fully disabled. Panel C shows that
the point estimate of crowd-out is somewhat higher for the partially disabled than
for the fully disabled (0.68 versus 0.52), but this difference is not statistically significant. Perhaps the high degree to which the fully disabled are able to replace
foregone disability income with earnings would not be surprising if the cut in disability income were minimal. This, however, is not the case. The more stringent
reexamination caused a €799 (standard error: 86) reduction in benefits among the
fully disabled. While this figure is only about half of the corresponding figure for
the partially disabled (€1,678, standard error: 126), it is still a meaningful reduction in benefits. Moreover, about 30 percent of the fully disabled who experienced
a benefit cut because of the more stringent reexamination became ineligible for DI.
In short, given that the fully disabled experienced meaningful cuts in benefits, the
high degree to which they were able to replace foregone disability income with labor
income is quite striking. However, it should be kept in mind that the disability rating
depended in part on the existence of sufficient suitable occupations in the applicant’s
region, and that an applicant could be classified as fully disabled if this criterion was
not met.
Panel D of Table 6 shows that, on average, both the partially and fully disabled
are able to offset basically all of their lost DI income by other sources of income.
The point estimates indicate that the fully disabled actually offset somewhat more of
the lost DI benefits than the partially disabled, but this difference is not statistically
significant.

these dimensions when we cut each dimension as closely as possible into two equally sized groups. See online
Appendix Table A7 for details. If we cut duration into three groups of roughly equal size (longer than ten years,
between four and ten years, and less than four years as of August 1, 1993), then we find that the labor supply
response among those with durations shorter than four years is significantly larger than the labor supply response
among those with durations between four and ten years. However, we continue to find a significant labor crowd-out
ratio even for those who have been on DI for over ten years. We cannot stratify our estimates by medical diagnosis
because much of this data was added retroactively and, consequently, is significantly less likely to be missing for
those who remained on DI. However, we can in principle use those remaining on DI to infer differential exit by medical diagnosis. The medical part of the reexamination was the same on either side of the age cutoff, which implies
there should be no causal effect of the more stringent reexamination on the medical diagnosis itself. Therefore, any
discontinuity at the age cutoff in the prevalence of a given medical diagnosis among those who remained on DI must
be due to differential exit by that medical diagnosis. Unfortunately, we lack statistical precision on this inferred
distribution of differential exit by medical diagnosis, as detailed in online Appendix Table A8.
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Table 5—Earnings Crowd-Out and Benefit Shifting by Source and by Gender
Effect of reform per 1,000 €/year
decrease in amount of original DI
Full sample

Panel A. Amounts in 1999
Total other social assistance, of which:
Unemployment insurance
General assistance
Reentry into DI
All other benefits
Total earnings, of which:
Wage earnings
Self-employment earning
Total income from other income sources
Panel B. Participation in 1999
Any income from other social assistance
Any unemployment insurance
Any general assistance
Reentry into DI
Any other benefits
Any work
Any wage income
Any self-employment income
Any other income source

0.305
(0.047)***
0.203
(0.020)***
0.030
(0.007)***
0.008
(0.008)
0.063
(0.041)

Males
0.261
(0.047)***
0.187
(0.021)***
0.032
(0.007)***

−0.001
(0.009)
0.043
(0.040)

Females

p-value
gender dif.

0.482
(0.146)***
0.266
(0.051)***
0.024
(0.024)
0.046
(0.025)*

0.149

0.146
(0.129)

0.618
(0.108)***
0.492
(0.098)***
0.126
(0.061)**

0.632
(0.124)***
0.497
(0.114)***
0.135
(0.070)*

0.564
(0.208)***
0.471
(0.181)***
0.093
(0.113)

0.781

0.923
(0.113)***

0.892
(0.127)***

1.046
(0.250)***

0.582

0.045
(0.005)***
0.034
(0.003)***
0.009
(0.002)***
0.001
(0.001)**
0.015
(0.004)***
0.029
(0.005)***
0.024
(0.005)***
0.006
(0.003)**
0.057
(0.006)***

0.038
(0.005)***
0.030
(0.003)***
0.010
(0.002)***
0.001
(0.001)*
0.010
(0.004)**
0.023
(0.005)***
0.018
(0.005)***
0.007
(0.003)**
0.044
(0.006)***

0.074
(0.016)***
0.050
(0.009)***
0.007
(0.006)
0.003
(0.002)
0.035
(0.013)***
0.053
(0.013)***
0.050
(0.012)***

0.037

−0.001
(0.005)
0.105
(0.019)***

0.026

0.002

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each entry in the table comes from a separate IV regression based on the
fuzzy RD design. The dependent variable is listed in the rows. Income and earnings are measured in thousands of
euros per year. “Other income sources” excludes DI income from the original spell. General assistance provides an
income floor for everyone and does not require having dependents. Any other benefits are benefits from a large number of smaller (about 30) benefit programs. The variable that is instrumented (endogenous explanatory variable) is
the amount of DI, so all coefficients can be interpreted as effect size per €1,000/year decrease in DI. The instrument
itself is the treatment dummy (age less than 45 as of August 1, 1993). The regressions are based on 84,185; 55,772;
and 28,413 observations for the full sample, males, and females, respectively. See the note to Table 4 for the demographic controls included in the regression.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 6—Earnings Crowd-Out and Benefit Shifting by Degree of Disability and Gender
Effect of reform per 1,000 €/year
decrease in amount of original DI
Full sample
Panel A. New DI benefit in 1999
Income from a new DI spell
Partially disabled in 1996
Fully disabled in 1996
p-value on difference by disability
Participation dummy
Partially disabled in 1996
Fully disabled in 1996
p-value on difference by disability
Panel B. Other social assistance in 1999
Income from other social assistance
Partially disabled in 1996
Fully disabled in 1996
p-value on difference by disability
Participation dummy
Partially disabled in 1996
Fully disabled in 1996
p-value on difference by disability
Panel C. Labor market outcomes in 1999
Earnings
Partially disabled in 1996
Fully disabled in 1996
p-value on difference by disability
Employment dummy
Partially disabled in 1996
Fully disabled in 1996
p-value on difference by disability

Males

Females

p-value gender
difference

0.005
(0.008)
0.010
(0.015)
0.770

0.001
(0.008)

−0.005
(0.015)
0.694

0.021
(0.025)
0.063
(0.042)
0.388

0.001
(0.001)
0.002
(0.001)*
0.419

0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.954

0.001
(0.002)
0.005
(0.003)
0.283

0.117
(0.047)**
0.491
(0.086)***

0.123
(0.049)**
0.421
(0.084)***
0.002

0.091
(0.141)
0.740
(0.263)***
0.029

0.833

0.015
(0.006)***
0.076
(0.010)***

0.015
(0.006)***
0.061
(0.009)***

0.012
(0.015)
0.128
(0.035)***
0.002

0.853

0.682
(0.166)***
0.520
(0.128)***
0.441

0.732
(0.186)***
0.506
(0.148)***
0.341

0.435
(0.357)
0.572
(0.250)**
0.753

0.023
(0.006)***
0.034
(0.008)***
0.246

0.020
(0.006)***
0.026
(0.009)***
0.555

0.037
(0.017)**
0.062
(0.019)***
0.333

<0.001

<0.001

<0.001

0.457
0.124

0.971
0.235

0.247

0.064

0.460
0.819

0.357
0.087

(Continued )

E. Responses of Partners of DI Recipients and Total Budgetary Impacts
In Table 7 we provide estimates of benefit substitution and earnings crowd-out at
the household level. These estimates differ from our baseline estimates of Table 4
in that the current estimates account for possible responses of partners of (former)
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Table 6—Earnings Crowd-Out and Benefit Shifting by Degree of Disability and Gender (Continued )
Effect of reform per 1,000 €/year
decrease in amount of original DI
Full sample
Panel D. Total
Income except from original DI spell
Partially disabled in 1996
Fully disabled in 1996
p -value on difference by disability
Dummy for work or other soc. asst.
Partially disabled in 1996
Fully disabled in 1996
p -value on difference by disability
Observations:
Partially disabled in 1996
Fully disabled in 1996

Males

Females

0.804
(0.163)***
1.021
(0.153)***
0.332

0.856
(0.182)***
0.921
(0.166)***
0.793

0.547
(0.360)
1.376
(0.392)***
0.119

0.030
(0.005)***
0.084
(0.011)***

0.028
(0.005)***
0.062
(0.011)***
0.005

0.036
(0.017)**
0.163
(0.041)***
0.004

<0.001

28,509
55,676

22,590
33,182

p-value gender
difference

0.444
0.285

0.656
0.017

5,919
22,494

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each entry in the table comes from a separate IV regression based on
the fuzzy RD design. The dependent variable is listed in the rows. Income and earnings are measured in thousands
of euros per year. The variable that is instrumented (endogenous explanatory variable) is the amount of DI, so all
coefficients can be interpreted as effect size per €1,000/year decrease in DI. The instrument itself is the treatment
dummy (age less than 45 as of August 1, 1993). Degree of disability is as determined by the disability administration (see text for the description of the procedure for the determination of degree of disability). See the note to Table
4 for the demographic controls included in the regression.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

DI recipients. We find that our point estimates of benefit substitution in the entire
sample are virtually identical whether or not we take the partners’ responses into
account. For men the benefit-substitution ratio becomes somewhat larger, while for
women it becomes smaller, but neither difference is statistically significant. Though
the increase in earnings crowd-out of 18 percentage points is not insubstantial in
economic terms, it is statistically insignificant. Earnings responses of partners were
previously studied by Cullen and Gruber (2000), who estimate that increased UI
benefits paid to unemployed males are largely offset by their wives’ decreased labor
market earnings, as well as by Duggan, Rosenheck, and Singleton (2010), who
exploit a policy change to show that an increase in disability benefits for Vietnam-era
veterans caused a reduction in their spouses’ labor supply. While partner responses
could potentially be significant, and therefore are important to consider, we find that
they play only a limited role in our setting. However, including the partner responses
does decrease the precision of our estimates, which is why we exclude them from
our other analyses.
The Dutch tax system makes no distinction between labor income and income
from social assistance programs, and the effective marginal tax rate is roughly constant at a rate of approximately 40 percent. This implies that a €1,000 reduction in
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Table 7—Earnings Crowd-Out and Benefit Shifting Including Partner Responses
Effect of reform per 1,000 €/year
decrease in amount of original DI
Full sample
Panel A. New DI benefit in 1999
Income from a new DI spell
Panel B. Other social assistance in 1999
Income from other social assistance
Panel C. Labor market outcomes in 1999
Earnings
Panel D. Total
Income except from original DI spell

p -value
gender difference

Males

Females

0.008
(0.008)

0.001
(0.008)

0.046
(0.025)*

0.074

0.294
(0.082)***

0.308
(0.065)***

0.238
(0.317)

0.830

0.795
(0.209)***

0.718
(0.182)***

1.102
(0.749)

0.619

1.097
(0.204)***

1.025
(0.185)***

1.386
(0.705)**

0.620

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each entry in the table comes from a separate IV regression based on
the fuzzy RD design. The dependent variable is listed in the rows. Income and earnings are measured in thousands
of euros per year. The variable that is instrumented (endogenous explanatory variable) is the amount of DI, so all
coefficients can be interpreted as effect size per €1,000/year decrease in DI. The instrument itself is the treatment
dummy (age less than 45 as of August 1, 1993). The regressions are based on 84,185 observations for the full sample, and on 55,772 and 28,413 observations for males and females, respectively. See the note to Table 4 for the
demographic controls included in the regression.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

DI benefits reduces government expenditures by about €600, net of taxes. According
to the estimates in the first column of Table 7, a €1,000 reduction in DI benefits
leads to increased expenditure on other social assistance programs (including
reentry into DI) by €302 (= €294 + €8), which comes at a cost of 0.60 × 302
= €181, net of taxes. Table 7 also shows that a €1,000 reduction in DI benefits
increases earnings by €795, which generates additional tax revenue of 0.40 × 795
= €318. Thus, the additional tax revenue from the labor supply response more than
offsets the additional costs from social support substitution. Consequently, for each
€1,000 (net €600) reduction in DI benefits, government spending decreases by
600 + 318 − 181 = €737. Thus, the combined effect of the labor supply response
and social support substitution increases government savings from the reduction in
DI benefits by 23 percent (= (737− 600)/600).
F. Responses over Time
Responses to reductions in DI benefits could vary over time for a variety of
reasons, including time limits on certain forms of social assistance and the search
time required to find a suitable match in the labor market. Hence, focusing only
on 1999 (about two years after the reexaminations for the relevant cohorts) yields
an incomplete picture of the consequences of the reform. Another concern is that
much of the decline in DI benefits for the under-45 cohort might be undone over
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Effect on DI benefit (in €1,000/yr)

Panel A. Effect of more stringent reexamination on DI benefits in €1,000/year
(first stage)
0
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Panel B. Earnings crowd-out and benefit shifting using the 1999 first stage
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Figure 6. Earnings Crowd Out and Benefit Shifting over Time
Note: The dotted lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals.

time through “promotions” in the disability rating. We therefore repeated our main
analyses for all years in our dataset.27
Panel A of Figure 6 presents estimates of the reduced-form RD regression of DI
benefit amounts for each of the years from 1999 to 2005. This panel shows that the
effect of the more stringent reexamination on DI benefit amounts is remarkably constant over time.28 Panel B shows estimates of the benefit-substitution ratio and the
earnings crowd-out ratio over time. We find that both the earnings crowd-out ratio
and benefit-substitution ratio are positive and statistically significant in each year
27

Additional DI reforms took place in 2002 and 2004. The first reform only affected new entrants, while the
second reform led to a reexamination of people on DI who were younger than 50 on July 1, 2004. All individuals in our sample were older than 50 at that time. Thus, these reforms do not affect the individuals in our sample.
However, the major overhaul of the DI system in 2006 did affect the individuals in our sample, which is why we
end our sample period in 2005.
28
We find a similar persistence of the effect of the more stringent reexamination when we examine the impact
on disability ratings rather than the impact on benefit amounts. In online Appendix Table A9, we repeat the analysis
of Table 3, but now for the years 1996 to 2005 (rather than 1996 to 1999, as in Table 3).
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except 2003, when the benefit-substitution ratio is only marginally statistically significant. The degree to which individuals replace lost DI benefits with other forms
of social assistance decreases over time, from 30 percent in 1999 to 14 percent in
2005. This decrease is statistically significant and is driven by the decreased reliance
on UI benefits over time. Whereas UI benefits account for 20 percentage points of
the benefit-substitution ratio in 1999, they only account for 5 percentage points in
2005. This decline is consistent with the fact that unemployment assistance is only
available for a limited duration. This decline is partly offset by increased reliance
on new DI spells. Income from new DI spells makes up for about 1 percent of lost
DI benefits in 1999, but 6 percent of lost DI benefits in 2005. Reliance on General
Assistance and other forms of social assistance remains roughly constant over time.
The figure shows a slight increase over time in the earnings crowd-out ratio, which
rises from 62 percent in 1999 to 71 percent in 2005, but this increase is not statistically significant. The fraction of earnings that comes from self-employment remains
roughly constant over time.
IV. Conclusion

In this paper, we investigate the consequences of a reduction in the generosity of
one social support program when that program is part of a larger system of social
assistance programs. Especially in the case of social assistance for people in their
prime age, there is relatively little evidence on the extent to which reduced generosity of one program induces increased labor supply, and to what extent it leads to
more reliance on other social assistance programs instead. Examining the labor supply response of existing beneficiaries (as opposed to labor supply responses to qualify for a program) is important for policy because a response by the large stock of
existing beneficiaries can quickly affect DI participation rates, whereas a response
by new enrollees will only slowly affect overall DI participation. Showing a labor
supply response of long-term DI beneficiaries (including individuals who are classified as fully disabled) also establishes that long-term participation in DI does not
severely degrade one’s labor market skills. Benefit substitution is of obvious policy
relevance in many countries. While most existing studies have investigated spillover
effects among programs for children or for people close to retirement, this paper
examines benefit-substitution and earnings crowd-out effects for people on DI in
their late forties. Finally, our paper recognizes that spillovers can be partly driven by
responses from partners of people affected by the reform and that the spillovers may
vary with the amount of time passed since the reform.
The combination of access to extensive administrative panel data and the presence of a cohort discontinuity in a reform law allows us to produce causal estimates
of the effect of reduced DI generosity on participation in other social assistance
programs. We find economically meaningful and statistically significant evidence
of social support substitution. About two years after the implementation of the DI
reform for our sample members, income drawn from other social assistance programs increases by €0.30 for each euro of reduced DI benefits. At 49 percent, the
benefit substitution effect is especially pronounced for the fully disabled, whereas it
is just 12 percent for partially disabled DI recipients. The benefit-substitution ratio
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decreases over time and reaches 14 percent about eight years after implementation
of the reform for our sample.
We also find a remarkable earnings rebound, given that all members of our sample were at least partially disabled and had, on average, been receiving DI for over a
decade when the reform was implemented for our cohorts. On average, individuals
were able to make up 62 percent of their foregone DI benefits through increased
earnings, and this figure is similar for partially and fully disabled individuals.
Between increased income from labor and other social assistance programs, individuals almost fully offset the decrease in DI benefits. Of course, these estimates are
based on a relatively minor (10 percent on average) cut in DI benefits, and may not
apply for larger cuts. Furthermore, because these estimates reveal average responses,
they can also mask more severe impacts on total income for certain subgroups of DI
recipients.
Benefit-substitution and earnings crowd-out estimates would obviously be different in different settings, but the direction in which the estimates would change is not
clear. Our benefit-substitution figure may be higher than it would be in other countries, as the Netherlands has a relatively generous system of alternative social assistance programs. On the other hand, the reform we analyzed concerned a relatively
minor reduction in DI generosity. Thus, many of those affected by the reform may
not have qualified for means-tested alternative forms of social assistance. Moreover,
alternative forms of social assistance may still have been less attractive than DI
(despite the reduction in DI generosity).
While our specific coefficient estimates only directly apply to this particular
Dutch DI reform, we believe our paper offers three general lessons that are widely
applicable. First, our paper provides strong evidence that spillover effects between
social assistance programs can be substantial, also for prime-aged individuals. Thus,
any analysis of reforms of social assistance programs would be well advised to consider the possibility of benefit substitution. Second, we show that, among long-term
disability recipients, there may still be a substantial capacity to change labor income
in response to relatively moderate changes in DI generosity. In other words, labor
supply among DI recipients is not just determined by limitations from disability, but
also by economic incentives. Finally, our work emphasizes that it could be important in some cases to take into account the responses of the partners of the individuals directly affected by the reform and to consider the amount of benefit substitution
and earnings crowd-out over the longer term.
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